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Microsoft is the most socially responsible company in the 
world, followed by Google on rank 2 and The Walt Disney 
Company on rank 3 – at least according to the perceptions 
of 47,000 people from 15 countries that participated in a 
survey conducted by the consultancy fi rm Reputation Insti-
tute. In this paper I take a critical look at Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility in media and communication industries. Within 
the debate on CSR media are often only discussed in regard 
to their role of raising awareness and enabling public debate 
about corporate social responsibility. What is missing are 
theoretical and empirical studies about the corporate social 
(ir)responsibility of media and communication companies 
themselves. This paper contributes to overcoming this blind 
spot. First I systematically describe four diff erent ways of 
relating profi t goals and social gaols of media and commu-
nication companies. I argue for a dialectical perspective that 
considers how profi t interests and social responsibilities 
mutually shape each other. Such a perspective can draw on 
a critical political economy of media and communication. 
Based on this approach I take a closer look at Microsoft, Goo-
gle and The Walt Disney Company and show that their actual 
practices do not correspond to their reputation. This analysis 
points at fl aws in the concept CSR. I argue that despite these 
limitations CSR still contains a rational element that can 
however only be realised by going beyond CSR. I therefore 
suggest a new concept that turns CSR off  its head and places 
it upon its feet.
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Microsoft is the most socially responsible company in the world, followed by 
Google and The Walt Disney Company – at least according to the perceptions of 
47,000 people from 15 countries that participated in a survey conducted by the 
consultancy fi rm Reputation Institute.1 Based on the results of this survey the 
Reputation Institute compiled a ranking of 100 companies with the best CSR rep-
utation worldwide. The top 3 companies in this ranking belong to the media and 
communication sector: Microsoft (rank 1), Google (rank 2), and The Walt Disney 
Company (rank 3) (Reputation Institute 2012, 19).
Considering the apparent success of the CSR strategies of leading media and 
communication companies it is surprising that the corporate social responsibilities 
of this sector have thus far been neglected as a research topic both in CSR research 
and in media and communication studies: Within the debate on CSR, media are 
often only discussed in regard to their role of raising awareness and enabling public 
debate about corporate social responsibility (Dyck and Zingales 2002, 5; EC 2011, 
7; Dickson and Eckman 2008, 726). What is lacking are theoretical and empirical 
studies about the corporate social (ir)responsibility of media and communication 
companies themselves. 
This paper contributes to overcoming this blind spot. In a fi rst step I discuss 
possible theoretical approaches to CSR in media and communication companies 
(section 2). Subsequently I take a closer look at the corporate social (ir)responsibility 
of the three companies that were ranked to have the best CSR reputation world-
wide (section 3). I show that the actual practices of Microsoft, Google and The Walt 
Disney Company do not correspond to their reputation. In the conclusion (section 
4) I therefore highlight the limitations of CSR and suggest an alternative concept. 
Theories of CSR in Media and Communication 
Industries
One of the fi rst theorists of CSR was Howard Bowen who defi ned the Social Re-
sponsibilities of the Businessman (1953) as “the obligations of businessman to pursue 
those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are 
desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” (Bowen 1953, 6). The 
idea that businessmen should serve society instead of only pursuing the interests 
of shareholders contradicted the dominant economic view according to which the 
purpose of the corporation is to maximise profi ts. 
In 1962 the infl uential liberal economist and winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize 
in Economic Sciences Milton Friedman therefore called CSR a “fundamentally sub-
versive doctrine” (Friedman 1962/1982) and later argued that the only responsibility 
of corporations is “to make as much money as possible” (Friedman 1970/2009, 75). 
Today CSR seems much less controversial: In 2011, 95 percent of the 250 largest 
global companies2 reported about their CSR activities (KPMG 2011, 7). However, 
the question remains how CSR theories deal with these two diﬀ erent goals that are 
ascribed to the corporation. How do theories of CSR relate the traditional corporate 
goal to maximise profi t and the goal to act socially responsible?
A systematic description of diﬀ erent approaches to the relation between the 
corporate and the social can be based on Wolfgang Hofk irchner’s (2003, 2013) dis-
tinction of four possible ways of relating two phenomena with diﬀ erent degrees of 
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diﬀ erentiation: reductionism, projectionism, dualism, and dialectics (Hofk irchner 
2003, 133). Reductionism reduces the higher diﬀ erentiated phenomenon to the 
lower diﬀ erentiated one. Projectionism in contrast projects the higher degree of 
diﬀ erentiation on the lower diﬀ erentiated side. Dualism separates both phenomena 
from each other and does not recognise any interrelations. Dialectical thinking on 
the contrary considers how both sides mutually shape each other.3 Based on this 
typology reductionist, projectionist and dualist approaches to CSR can be described 
as follows:
• Reductionism reduces the social responsibilities of the corporation to a means 
for advancing profi t goals. Acting socially responsible is regarded as a means 
for avoiding government regulation (e.g. Almeder 1980, 13), for opening up 
new markets and business opportunities (e.g. Drucker 1984) or for improving 
corporate image and reputation and creating good relationships with stake-
holders (e.g. Jones 1995).
• Projectionism on the contrary projects ethical principles or a social conscious-
ness onto the profi t goals of corporations. This approach does not question 
the profi t motive as such but highlights that profi t should be generated in a 
socially responsible way. According to the projectionist view this is possible by 
subjecting profi t generation to the expectations of society (e.g. Frederick 1960; 
Carroll 1979), equal respect for the interests of all stakeholders (e.g. Freeman 
1994), government regulation (e.g. McInerney 2007), or democratic control 
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007).  
• Dualism treats economic and social goals of the media as disjunctive and argues 
that media companies should simultaneously achieve both, being economically 
successful and acting socially responsible. In a dualist manner the concept of 
philanthropy for example postpones socially responsible behaviour to a point 
after profi t goals have already been achieved (e.g. Carnegie 1889).
• A dialectical perspective considers mutual interrelations between profi t goals 
and social responsibilities and therefore describes the relation between the 
corporate and the social as inherently confl ictual. This approach puts forward 
a critique of dominant CSR theories (Corlett  1998, 103; Banerjee 2008, 73; Sklair 
and Miller 2010; Fleming and Jones 2013, 6). It is based on the insight that profi t 
generation necessarily means exploitation, injustice and inequality. A dialectical 
approach highlights that understood as voluntary corporate self-regulation, 
CSR strengthens corporate power rather than limiting it. It therefore stresses 
that CSR should not be reduced to a managerial question but be discussed on 
a political level. 
In the following I apply this typology to theories of CSR in media and commu-
nication industries. 
Reductionism: Social Responsibility as Strategic Advantage
Reductionist accounts of the social responsibility of the media highlight how 
social issues can be approached in ways that benefi t business interest. In this manner, 
Anke Trommershausen (2011) tries to show how addressing emerging challenges 
in the area of communication and culture can be turned into strategic opportuni-
ties for companies (Trommerhausen 2011, 27). Based on Carsten Winter’s (2006) 
concept of the TIME (telecommunication, information, media, and entertainment) 
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industries, she analysed Corporate Social Responsibility in telecommunication, 
information and media (TIM) companies.
Trommershausen (2011, 30) argues that the particular “social” about the re-
sponsibility of TIM(E) companies lies in the realm of communication and culture. 
She stresses that the challenges related to the emergence of digital network media 
could be turned into strategic advantages if corporate responsibility strategies focus 
on the core business of a company (Trommershausen 2011, 181): the challenge of 
ensuring access would for create potentials for entering new markets (Trommer-
shausen 2011, 171-174); the challenge of changing stakeholder relations would 
entail the potential of successfully managing stakeholders by individualising 
relations to stakeholders through digital media (Trommershausen 2011, 174-178); 
the challenge of enabling the constitution of a public sphere would yield long term 
strategic potentials if TIM(E) companies ensure a secure and fair access to digital 
media products and services (Trommerhausen 2011, 179-181); the challenge of 
corporate responsibility management could result in competitive advantages if 
professional corporate responsibility management and control strategies are es-
tablished  (Trommershausen 2011, 182). 
Trommershausen’s approach to CSR in media and communication companies 
is based on a corporate logic according to which business goals are more import-
ant than social responsibilities. She argues that realising competitive advantages 
requires a strategic approach to CSR “Only that way it becomes possible to exploit 
strategic potentials and test them with respect to a Return on Corporate Respon-
sibility based on the Business Case” (Trommershausen 2011, 182 translation MS4). 
The notion of a “Return on Corporate Responsibility” reduces the idea of social 
responsibility ad absurdum – instead of contributing to the common good, respon-
sible behaviour is supposed to yield a fi nancial return. 
Apart from its instrumentality, another limitation of Trommershausen’s ap-
proach is its exclusive focus on the media’s responsibilities for communication 
and culture. She argues that media convergence has lead to the emergence of 
digital network media, which include hardware such as PCs, notebooks, mobile 
phones as well as web 2.0 media such as weblog and wikis (Trommershausen 2011, 
33). The hardware industry is an example that perfectly illustrates that working 
conditions and environmental destruction are important issues for the media and 
communication sector.5 Trommerhausen ignores these issues when arguing that 
the particular social about the responsibility of TIM(E) companies is their respon-
sibility for communication and culture and thus fails to grasp the whole range of 
social responsibilities of the media and communication sector. 
CSR strategies that are based on such a reductionist approach are likely to be 
highly selective and will ignore social problems if addressing them contradicts 
business goals. The main benefi ciaries of a reductionist approach to the social re-
sponsibility of the media are the owners and shareholders of media corporations. 
Projectionism: Ethics in a Commercial Media System
Projectionist approaches are based on the assumption that in order to be so-
cially responsible, media should meet the expectations of society. Following this 
view responsible media, despite their commercial organisation, need to embody 
certain moral values. Projectionist approaches become manifest in ethics codes for 
journalism and the media.
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Already in 1956 Siebert, Peterson and Schramm described a social responsi-
bility theory of the press as one of Four Theories of the Press, which is based on the 
assumption that the commercial organisation of media needs to be balanced by a 
strong ethical awareness. It therefore points at the necessity of establishing ethical 
codes that ensure that the press works for “the public good” (Siebert, Peterson and 
Schramm 1956, 76ﬀ ).
Early examples of such codes are the code by the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors (1923) and the recommendations made in the report A Free and Responsible 
Press (1947) by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press, known as the Hutchins 
Commission. The aim of ethics codes is that the media, despite their commercial 
organisation, meet their social responsibilities. They “provide working journalists 
with statements of minimums and perceived ideals” (Elliot-Boyle 1985/1986, 25). 
These standards specify ideal journalistic behaviour in respect to ethical issues of 
journalistic practices, which include “freedom, objectivity, truth, honesty, privacy” 
(Belsey and Chadwick 1994, xiii). Himelboim and Limor argue that journalistic 
ethics codes are designed to defi ne the role of journalists in society (Himelboim 
and Limor 2011, 76). 
Irrespective of their particular content a main problem regarding voluntary 
ethics codes is, that they contain guidelines for journalists without suﬃ  ciently 
considering how economic realities hamper the implementation of these guidelines. 
Market pressures often constrain the work of journalists. McQuail for example 
points out that codes of ethics provide some normative guidelines, which however 
cannot always be applied in actual journalistic practices (McQuail 2010, 172). Codes 
that simply demand from journalists to protect sources, be truthful and fair (Laitila 
1995), to ensure integrity truth and, objectivity (Jones C. 1980, 83), or to commit to 
the public’s right to know (Himelboin and Limor 2011, 82) treat ethical behaviour 
as an individual responsibility of journalists. 
Awareness of journalists for their role in society is certainly important. It is 
however doubtful that ethical commitments of journalists are enough for achieving 
a socially responsible media system. Some contributors to the fi eld of media ethics 
recognise this shortcoming. McManus for example stresses: “Major American jour-
nalism ethics codes, however, not only fail to examine the corporate profi t motive, 
most don’t even recognise its existence” (McManus 1997, 13). Similarly Richards 
highlights: “At a theoretical level, one of the major weaknesses in many analyses 
of journalism ethics is the failure to accommodate the realities of corporatism” 
(Richards 2004, 123). The projectionist belief that commercial media can become 
socially responsible through imposing on them guidelines for ethical behaviour is 
both individualistic and idealistic and likely to overlook existing economic pressures 
and necessities. In a commercial media system journalism is a business and media 
companies that strive for a profi t are subject to the forces of competitive markets, 
which can contradict journalistic ethics.
Dualism: Commercial Success and Ethical Behaviour
Dualist approaches to CSR treat economic interests and social responsibilities 
of the media as separate from each other. Altmeppen’s (2011) concept of “me-
dia social responsibility” exemplifi es this approach. It is based on a distinction 
between journalism and the media. According to Altmeppen, journalism selects 
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topics and creates content that can be distributed via the media. In Altmeppen’s 
view journalism is no business model. It would depend on media organisations 
that ensure its funding and distribute its products (Altmeppen 2011, 249). Media 
organisations on the contrary would generate money through the distribution of 
content, which allows them to pay for journalism and the production of media 
content (Altmeppen 2011, 249). 
According to Altmeppen (2011, 257-259) the responsibility of journalism is 
related to its societal role, which would consist in the production of socially im-
portant information. The main social responsibility of media companies would on 
the contrary lie in providing the necessary resources for journalistic production. 
Treating media and journalism as structurally and functionally diﬀ erent entities 
establishes a dualism between economic goals and social responsibility: Media 
generate profi t, journalism is ethical.
The analytical distinction between journalism and media for identifying social 
responsibilities is questionable. In fact both are operating together, journalistic 
production requires fi nancial resources, and media organisations cannot make 
money without journalism. Neither of the two is able to operate without the other, 
which creates strong mutual dependencies. A dualism between content (journal-
ism) and organisational form (media) that assumes that media is a business model 
while journalism is not, runs danger of regarding journalism as independent from 
market pressures. Furthermore Altmeppen’s claim that journalism would be no 
business model is questionable. He himself argues that “media ‘pay’ a ‘price’ to 
journalism for its creation of informative, topical content” (Atmeppen 2011, 258 
translation MS6). This shows that the business model of journalism is selling media 
content to media companies. Media companies receive money from advertising 
clients. Those who pay for journalism in fact are advertisers. What Altmeppen 
conceptualises as media is just the administrative intermediary that organises the 
sale of advertisements. It is exactly this double role of media content companies 
as at the same time both profi t-oriented economic entities and providers of media 
content, which challenges the media’s ability to meet its social responsibilities. An 
approach that is based on a distinction between media and journalism misses this 
double role and resulting challenges.
Dialectics: The Social Irresponsibility of Commercial Media
Dialectical approaches stress that economic goals and social responsibilities 
of the media mutually shape each other. From this perspective economic success 
and profi tability of media companies have consequences that impair their social 
responsibility. At the same time socially responsible media that resist commercial 
mechanisms and market pressures are likely to suﬀ er from a lack of resources and 
visibility.
Streams of media studies that – without referring to the notion of CSR – have 
always stressed the importance of considering interrelations between the economic 
organisation of media and their social and cultural roles and responsibilities are 
critical theory and political economy of media and communication. 
Already Karl Marx pointed out that the press has the important social role of 
serving as a public watchdog. According to Marx the press should be “the public 
watchdog, the tireless denouncer of those in power, the omnipresent eye, the 
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omnipresent mouthpiece of the people’s spirit that jealously guards its freedom” 
(Marx 1849/1959, 2317). He at the same time recognised that in order to fulfi l its 
important social role, the press needs to be organised in a non-commercial way: 
“The primary freedom of the press lies in not being a trade” (Marx 1842/1976, 718). 
Following Marxian thinking, critical political economy of media and commu-
nication departs from the insight that media have a double role in society: they on 
the one hand are profi t oriented corporations and on the other hand have certain 
special social and cultural responsibilities. Murdock and Golding point out “that 
the mass media are fi rst and foremost industrial and commercial organisations 
which produce and distribute commodities” (Murdock and Golding 1997, 3ﬀ ). 
However, they at the same time stress that media production also has an important 
ideological role, “which gives it its importance and centrality and which requires 
an approach in terms not only of economics but also of politics” (Murdock and 
Golding 1997, 4ﬀ ). Similarly Oscar Gandy stresses: “The media are seen to have an 
economic as well as an ideologic dimension” (Gandy 1997, 100). 
Based on this recognition of the double role of media and communication, crit-
ical political economy highlights that understanding the media’s eﬀ ects in society 
requires studying them within the wider context of capitalism. Mosco argues that 
critical political economy decentres the media: “Decentering the media means 
viewing systems of communication as integral to fundamental economic, political, 
and other material constituents” (Mosco 2009, 66). Herman and McChesney point 
at the necessity of considering global capitalism for understanding the social role 
of the media (Herman and McChesney 1997, 10). Similarly Garnham emphasised 
that understanding the capitalist mode of production is essential for the study of 
cultural practices (Garnham 1998, 611). Knoche points out that analysing the rela-
tionship between media and capitalism is among the basic questions of a critical 
political economy of culture (Knoche 2002, 105)
These statements illustrate that studying interrelations between the economic 
dimensions of media and communication on the one hand, and their social and 
cultural responsibilities on the other hand is at the heart of a critical political econ-
omy of the media. Based on this orientation critical political economists highlight 
how economic mechanisms and pressures that are at play in a commercial media 
system, impair the ability of media to meet their social responsibilities: They (a) 
show how generating private profi t based on media and communication requires 
the exploitation of media producers, audiences and prosumers (Garnham 1986/2006, 
224; Smythe 1977/1997, 440; Fuchs 2011a, 2010). Critical approaches to the role of 
media in society (b) highlight that producing media as commodities leads to the 
subsumption of culture under market principles and commercial pressures, which 
fosters uniformity, conformism (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947/1997) and ideolog-
ical media content (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Schiller 1997; McChesney 2004). 
A critical political economy perspective (c) shows that the circulation of media 
and communication products as commodities has as a consequence that access to 
these goods is restricted. A commercial media system turns media into “a source 
of private profi t rather then […] to provide information widely and cheaply to 
all” (Garnham 1983, 19ﬀ ). The fact that in a corporate media system media access 
becomes structured by income, fett ers the empowering potential of media and 
communication (Murdock and Golding 2002, 124), and threatens the democratic 
process (Schiller and Schiller 1988, 154). 
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Based on this brief overview over the research fi eld of critical political economy 
of communication, one can conclude that a dialectical perspective on the social re-
sponsibilities of the media emphasises that business interests of media companies 
tend to undermine the creation of a socially responsible media system: In order 
to be economically successful, corporate media need to produce media and com-
munication products as commodities that are based on the exploitation of labour 
power of employees and/or media users; need to produce media content that meets 
the preferences of the majority and that creates advertising friendly climate; and 
need to enforce the exclusion from media and communication products in order to 
be able to accumulate profi t. Commercial media are thus creating a media culture 
that is based on exploitation, conformity and exclusion.
The ideas advanced by dialectical approaches to the social responsibility of the 
media are embodied in the concept of public service broadcasting as an alternative 
to the commercial media model. The idea of public broadcasting is based on the 
insight that in order to be able to serve the public interest, broadcasting needs to 
be freed from market pressures and the need to be fi nancially successful (Seaton 
2003, 112ﬀ ; McQuail 2010, 178). However, since the 1980s the deregulation of media 
markets has increasingly put public broadcasting under pressure (McChesney 1997; 
Murdock and Golding 1999, 125). Public broadcasting stations in Europe today 
have to compete with numerous private radio and television companies and are 
thus no longer free from market pressures. 
With the decline of the public service broadcasting model the success of the 
commercial media becomes complete. The question of how commercial mecha-
nisms aﬀ ect the social responsibilities of the media in their everyday operations 
and which consequences this has for media and communication in the 21st century 
thus becomes ever more pressing.
Corporate Social (Ir)responsibility in Media and 
Communication Companies
I began this chapter with a reference to the CSR reputation ranking complied 
by the Reputation Institute, according to which Microsoft, Google and The Walt 
Disney Company are the three companies with the best CSR reputation worldwide. 
In the previous section I argued that in order to assess corporate social (ir)respon-
sibilities it is necessary to consider interrelations between a company’s economic 
goals and its social responsibility. Based on such a dialectical perspective on CSR 
I will in the following discuss in how far the actual practices of these companies 
correspond to their reputation.  
Microsoft – Knowledge Monopoly?
People around the globe are using Microsoft’s proprietary software: In Septem-
ber 2011 the operating system MS Windows had a worldwide market share of 86.57 
percent.9 Given this dominant market position, it is not surprising that Microsoft 
is economically highly successful: In 2011 it was the largest software company 
and the 42nd largest company in the world.10 In the fi nancial year 2012 Microsoft’s 
net profi ts were almost 17 billion USD, its revenues amounted to 73.7 billion USD 
and its total assets were 121.2 billion USD (Microsoft SEC-Filings, 10-k form 2012).
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Microsoft is however not only an economically successful company, but also 
committ ed to CSR. Since 2003 the company published nine CSR reports. In its 
most recent Citizenship report Microsoft highlights, “Our citizenship mission is to 
serve globally the needs of communities and fulfi l our responsibility to the public” 
(Microsoft 2013, 2).
Despite this commitment to CSR, Microsoft has been strongly criticised for its 
business practices. In the late 1990 the company was criminally convicted both 
in the United States and in Europe11 for maintaining “its monopoly power by 
anti-competitive means.”12
Apart from these violations of anti-trust laws, critics highlight that even on a 
more basic level Microsoft’s business model is socially irresponsible. Microsoft’s 
business success is based on proprietary software and thus on software patents: 
Until September 2011 Microsoft had registered 22,501 patents at the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Oﬃ  ce.13 
Civil society initiatives such as the “Free Software Foundation’s End Software 
Patents” in the United States and “No Software Patents” in Europe highlight 
that software patents are problematic in several respects: Their main arguments 
against software patents include that software patents create advantages for large 
corporations and lead to monopolisation; hinder innovation; privatise and restrict 
access to knowledge; threaten the freedom of information; create artifi cial scarcity 
and that software consists of mathematical formulas and abstract ideas, which are 
not patentable.14 Open Source Watch stresses that “For many in the open source 
community, the company [Microsoft] represents all that is troubling about closed 
source software development” (OSS Watch 2011).
Microsoft is aware of the fact that patents are a fett er to creativity and innova-
tion. Bill Gates in 1991 stressed that patents hamper technological innovation: “If 
people had understood how patents would be granted when most of today’s ideas 
were invented, and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete 
standstill today” (Gates 1991). Microsoft’s business practices thus deprive society 
from the best possible software. Making all software source codes publicly available 
would allow other programmers to further adapt, develop, and improve software. 
Collectively, the chances are higher that software is developed that matches the 
various needs of individuals and society.
Microsoft, through patenting software and requiring users to purchase a license 
in order to be allowed to use it, makes software scarce. This creates access barriers 
and thus fosters digital exclusion. In its CSR communication Microsoft highlights 
that the digital divide hampers the realisation of the full potentials of technology: 
“Technology is a potent force that can empower millions of people to reach their 
goals and realise their dreams – but for many people around the world, the Digital 
Divide keeps that power out of reach” (Microsoft 2003, 23). Microsoft repeatedly 
made a “comprehensive commitment to digital inclusion, and to help address 
inequities” (Microsoft 2004, 48). For that purpose Microsoft initiated programs 
that are intended to confront the digital divide, such as the Unlimited Potential 
(UP) program in which Microsoft makes donations to community centres libraries 
and schools in third world countries (Microsoft 2003, 23); the Partners in Learning 
programme, which for example consist in equipping school PCs with the Windows 
operating system (Microsoft 2003, 23ﬀ ), and most recently the Microsoft YouthSpark 
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Initiative that aims at “helping the next generation use technology to make a real 
impact for a bett er tomorrow“ (Microsoft 2013, 1).
These programs do not change the fact that proprietary software as such ham-
pers access to software and fosters exclusion. Quite on the contrary the company’s 
programmes rather strengthen the dependence on Microsoft products. Students 
acquire the skills for using Microsoft’s software, instead of being trained on how 
to use available open source alternatives. These initiatives thus help Microsoft in 
establishing new markets for its proprietary software. Microsoft’s supposed att empt 
to reduce digital inequality further promotes it.
Microsoft’s business interests confl ict with the common good: Instead of al-
lowing the collective capacities of the human intellect to develop the best possible 
software for society and making it universally accessible. Microsoft – the company 
with the worldwide best CSR reputation – patents software and monopolises ac-
cess to knowledge in order to create the highest possible profi ts for the company.
Google – Evil Spy?
Google controls 84.77 percent of the global search engine market.15 According to 
the Alexa Top Sites Ranking Google.com is the most frequently accessed website 
on the Internet.16 The company’s profi ts between 2001 and 2010 on average grew 
by 103 percent each year and reached 8.5 billion USD in 2010 (Google SEC-Filings, 
10-k forms 2004-2010). This income is almost entirely based on advertising: In 
2010 Google’s revenues were 29.3 billion USD, 96 percent of which was generated 
through advertisements (Google SEC-Filings, 10-k form 2010).
Users can access all of Google’s services free of charge. While using these services 
users produce a huge amount of information. This data ranges from demographic 
user information, to technical data and usage statistics, to search queries and even 
the content of emails. Google turns this data into a commodity in order to generate 
profi t: Instead of selling its services as a commodity to users, its business model 
consists in selling user data as a commodity to advertisers.
Google considers this business model as socially responsible. Its famous corpo-
rate credo is “You can make money without being evil.”17 The company describes 
its business model as benefi cial for both advertisers and users. Advertisers would 
benefi t from personalised marketing opportunities while users would receive 
relevant ads: “We give advertisers the opportunity to place clearly marked ads 
alongside our search results. We strive to help people fi nd ads that are relevant 
and useful, just like our results.”18
However, critics highlight that Google’s business model is more problematic 
than this description suggests. Scholars (e.g. Tene 2008; Fuchs 2010; Fuchs 2011b; 
Vaidhyanathan 2011) as well as corporate watchdogs (GoogleWatch.com;19 Privacy 
International 2007; Google Monitor 2011) highlight that Google’s business model of 
selling user data to advertisers constitutes a fundamental invasion of user privacy. 
Google Monitor for example stressed: “Google’s targeted advertising business 
model is no ‘privacy by design’ and no ‘privacy by default’” (Google Monitor 
2011). Likewise Vaidhyanathan argues that Google’s privacy policy is “prett y much 
a lack-of-privacy policy” (Vaidhyanathan 2011, 84) and Maurer et al. stress that 
“Google is massively invading privacy” (Maurer et al. 2007, 5).
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These critics show that the commodifi cation of user data entails the threat of 
surveillance and invades the rights of Internet users. The use of user data for ad-
vertising purposes requires the creation of databases that contain huge amounts 
of information about each Google user and to make information about individ-
uals available to private companies. The information stored in databases can be 
combined in diﬀ erent ways in order to identify diﬀ erent consumer groups that 
might be susceptible to certain products. For Internet users it becomes impossible 
to determine, which of their data is stored in which databases and to whom it is 
accessible. The fact that this information is available could at some point in the 
future have negative eﬀ ects for an individual user. The available data could for 
example support discriminatory practices (Gandy 1993, 2) by allowing to identify 
which individuals have a certain sexual orientation or political opinion or suﬀ er 
from a certain disease. 
An example that illustrates how widespread the use of information stored 
in Google’s databases can be and how diﬃ  cult it is for users to maintain control 
over their personal information is the so-called Prism programme of the US Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA). In 2013 documents were revealed that show that 
the NSA can access the systems of Google and other Internet companies such as 
Facebook20 and collect and store a variety of data about Internet users including 
search histories, content of emails, or live chats,21 Google oﬃ  cially refutes these 
allegations,22 even though US President Barack Obama confi rmed the existence of 
the surveillance scheme.23 
Furthermore extensive advertising does contribute to the commercialisation of 
the Internet. As a consequence of an advertising-based business model, which char-
acterises not only Google, but most web 2.0 companies (Sandoval 2012), users are 
permanently confronted and annoyed with ads for consumer goods and services.
Google’s philosophy is based on the principle of not being evil. The inventor 
of this famous mott o, Paul Buchheit stressed in an interview that this slogan was 
intended to demarcate Google from its competitors which “were kind of exploiting 
the users to some extent” (Buchheit 2008, 170). However, Google’s business model 
is also based on the exploitation of users (Fuchs 2010, 2011b) as it turns data, which 
Google users produce while using their services, into its property that is then sold 
as a commodity to advertisers. 
Google provides services that are highly valued by most Internet users. How-
ever, if they want to use these services they have no other choice than consenting 
to Google’s terms of services and the usage of their data for advertising purposes. 
This gives Google a high amount of power over deciding about how user data 
are used and to whom they are made available. The free accessibility of Google’s 
services thus comes at high costs: the renunciation of the right to determine the 
use of personal information.
Google’s history of tax avoidance further shows that in the end the company’s 
profi t interest outweigh its commitment to do business that benefi ts society and is 
not evil: A report published by the UK Public Accounts Committ ee (PAC) revealed 
that between 2006 and 2011 Google’s revenue based on UK operations amounted 
to 18 billion USD, while during that period the company only paid 16 million USD 
in UK corporation tax (PAC 2013, 5). By avoiding taxes Google fails to fulfi l one of 
its basic responsibilities to society.
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The Walt Disney Company – Nightmare Factory?
In 2011 The Walt Disney Company was ranked number 141 in Forbes list of the 
2000 biggest corporations worldwide. Between 2000 and 2010 Disney’s profi ts on 
average grew by 15 percent each year (Disney SEC-Filings, 10-k forms 2000-2010). 
In 2012 Disney’s total revenues amounted to 42.3 billion USD, which consist of 
income from media networks (46 percent), parks and resorts (30.5 percents), studio 
entertainment (13.8 percent), consumers products (7.7 percent) and interactive 
services (2 percent) (The Walt Disney Company SEC-Filings, 10-k form 2012). 
These data show that the media content business still makes up the largest part of 
Disney’s revenues. However, 38.2 percent of the revenues from the Walt Disney 
Company are derived from theme parks and consumer products. The Walt Disney 
Company in its CSR communication prides itself of being “the world’s largest 
licensor” of manufactured goods (The Walt Disney Company 2008, 5; The Walt 
Disney Company 2010, 5).
Disney has developed a strategy to exploit the popularity of its movie charac-
ters through Disney theme parks, Disney books, Disney toys, Disney furniture, 
Disney clothes, etc. Disney brought the strategy of cross-promotion to perfection. 
Janet Wasko in her book Understanding Disney (2001) states: “Indeed, the Disney 
company has developed the strategy so well that it represents the quintessential 
example of synergy in the media/entertainment industry. ‘Disney synergy’ is the 
phrase typically used to describe the ultimate in cross-promotional activities” 
(Wasko 2001, 71).
In its 2012 Citizenship Targets Disney states that it wants to “act and create in 
an ethical manner and consider the consequences of our decisions on people and 
the planet” (The Walt Disney Company 2013, 2). Disney presents itself as a socially 
responsible company, also in respect to working conditions in its supply chain: In 
its 2008 CSR report the company for example stressed: “We strive to foster safe, 
inclusive and respectful workplaces wherever we do business and wherever our 
products are made” (The Walt Disney Company 2008, 11). 
However, during the last 15 years NGOs have continuously criticised Walt Dis-
ney for violating labour laws and its own Code of Conduct. In 1996, the National 
Labor Committ ee (NLC) revealed violations of labour laws and human rights in 
Haitian supplier factories of North-American companies such as Walt Disney and 
Wal-Mart. In a factory licensed by Disney, workers producing “Mickey Mouse” 
and “Pocahontas” pyjamas were paid only 12 cents per hour, which was far below 
the legal minimum (NLC 1996). After these conditions in Disney’s Haiti-based 
supplier factories became public, Disney not only adapted its Code of Conduct 
for Suppliers and established the International Labor Standards (ILS) Program, 
but also relocated its production to China (China Labour Watch 2010a, 6), where 
violations of human rights and labour standards continued to exist
During the last years labour rights activists have documented a large number 
of corporate wrongdoings regarding working conditions in Disney’s supplier 
companies. Criticism was voiced by several watchdog organisations such as China 
Labour Watch, Student and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour and Students 
Disney Watch. These organisations report about sweatshop-like working condi-
tions in Disney’s supplier factories. The problems detected based on interviews 
with workers relate to:
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• Non-compliance with minimum wage regulations (SACOM 2005, 14-19; SA-
COM2006, 11-13; China Labour Watch 2010a);
• Excessive and compulsory overtime work (SACOM and NLC 2005, 7; SACOM 
2010a; Students Disney Watch 2009, 1f);
• Poor living conditions in factory dormitories (SACOM 2006, 16), high work 
pressure (SACOM and NLC 2005, 11);
• Unsafe working environments, chemical hazards or high level of dust or noise 
without protection equipment (SACOM 2005, 6-13; China Labour Watch 2009, 
2; Students Disney Watch 2009, 1f);
• No or only insuﬃ  cient labour contracts (SACOM 2006, 10; Students Disney Watch 
2009, 1f) and denial of health or pension insurance (SACOM and NLC 2005, 14);
• In some of Disney’s supplier factories even child labour was detected (China 
Labour Watch 2009, 3; China Labour Watch 2010b 11, 19).
The Disney brand is famous for creating exciting worlds of happiness – unfor-
tunately for thousands of factory workers the reality cannot live up to this fantasy. 
Students Disney Watch states: “Disney strives very hard to create a theme park and 
culture featured with fantasy and happiness. Nevertheless, Disney does not have 
any interest in the well-beings of the workers who produce Mickey Mouse in the 
sweatshops” (Students Disney Watch 2009, 2).
Workers in Disney’s supplier factories are producing toys, books, clothes, and 
furniture. These merchandising products for Disney’s children’s program, family 
movies, TV shows, and series symbolise a world of fun, joy, fantasy, and happy 
endings. It is sad irony that the day-to-day working reality of the mostly young 
workers in Disney’s factories is opposed to joyful fantasy worlds Disney creates 
in its TV and fi lm productions.
Conclusion
The examples described in the previous section illustrate the limitations of CSR: 
Despite the fact that the companies discussed here have a good CSR reputation; 
their actual practices are socially irresponsible. Their profi t interests make socially 
responsible behaviour impossible: Microsoft’s profi ts depend on software patents, 
which turn knowledge into a scarce good and thus contradict the possibility of es-
tablishing open and accessible knowledge resources. Google needs to commodify 
user data in order to generate profi t and thus contributes to the commercialisation 
of the Internet and the surveillance and exploitation of Internet users. The extreme 
exploitation of workers in the supply chain of the Walt Disney Company ensures 
to keep production costs low and profi t margins high.
The debate on CSR largely focuses on voluntary corporate self-regulation. CSR 
often serves as an argument for legitimising neoliberal deregulation and privatisa-
tion: corporations are supposed to voluntarily adopt responsible behaviour rather 
than being obliged to it by law. The examples discussed here however reveal a 
fundamental contradiction between corporate interests in profi t maximisation on 
the one hand and socially responsible conduct on the other hand. It is unlikely that 
corporations will voluntarily refrain from irresponsible behaviour if this under-
mines their profi t interests. This therefore points at the limits of voluntary CSR. The 
idea of voluntary corporate self-regulation is deeply fl awed: it strengthens rather 
than limits corporate power, it depoliticises the quest for a responsible economy, 
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and it ideologically mask how corporate interests, competition and power structures 
are related to irresponsible conduct. 
Nevertheless the increased quest for CSR shows that there is a desire within 
society for an economy that is socially responsible. Largely constrained by the 
premise that corporate conduct can be rendered socially responsible through vol-
untary self-regulation, it however fails to realise this goal. Establishing a socially 
responsible media and communication system requires going beyond CSR. For 
that purpose one can employ a technique that Marx suggested for discovering the 
“rational kernel” in Hegel’s idealist understanding of dialectics. Marx argued that 
Hegel’s dialectics “is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discov-
er the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (Marx 1867/1990, 103). The same 
holds true for CSR. In order to discover its “rational kernel” within the “mystical 
shell,” CSR must be turned from its head to its feet – turned from its head to its 
feet, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) turns into the Responsibility to Socialise 
Corporations (RSC).
RSC is the logical continuation of a dialectical approach to CSR that considers 
confl icts between the profi t motive and social responsibility: in order to become 
truly social, capitalist corporations need to be socialised, so that private wealth 
turns into common wealth. Socialising the media means to replace the privately 
controlled commercial media system with a socially controlled non-commercial 
media system.
Rather than relying on corporate self-regulation, RSC points at the need to 
expand democratic social control over corporate conduct and to restrict corporate 
power. This can be achieved through government regulation on the one hand and 
pressure form civil society groups on the other hand. As the discussion of Micro-
soft’s, Google’s and Disney’s corporate social irresponsibilities illustrates, corporate 
watchdogs play an important role in exposing corporate misconduct that reveals 
the failure of corporations to live up to their own codes of conducts, CSR policies 
and promises of self-regulation. RSC furthermore points at the need to strengthen 
non-commercial alternatives in the media and communication system. Only freed 
from the need to accumulate and to maximise private profi ts, media and commu-
nication can realise their full potentials and contribute to the common good. This 
requires political reforms that improve the structural conditions for establishing 
alternative media projects and that foster the transformation from a commercial 
towards a commons based media and communication system.
Notes:
1. France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea, United States, Canada, Brazil and Mexico Source: Reputation Institute. 2012. CSR is Not Dead, 
It is just Mismanaged. Retrieved from http://www.reputationinstitute.com/thought-leadership/csr-
reptrak-100?/thought-leadership/2012-corporate-social-responsibility on February 14, 2013.
2. Based on the Fortune Global 500 List: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/
3.  In regard to profi t goals and social goals of media companies, the former can be considered 
as the lower and the latter as the higher diff erentiated phenomenon: Profi t is a goal of a single 
corporation within the economic sub-system of society. Caring for social issues on the contrary 
means contributing to the functioning of society as a whole and not just to the success of one of 
its parts. Doing social good and contributing to the well-being of society can thus be described 
as a more complex and higher diff erentiated goal than generating profi t and contributing to the 
well-being of the corporation. 
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4. “Nur so können die strategischen Potenziale tatsächlich genutzt und hinsichtlich eines Return 
on Corporate Responsibility durch den Business Case geprüft werden.” (Trommershausen 2011, 
182).
5. The European project makeITfair for example has shown in numerous reports that on the one 
hand unacceptable working conditions exists in the supply chain of media hardware companies 
and that on the other hand the improper disposal of electronic products creates fundamental 
threats for human health and the environment. See: http://makeitfair.org/en?set_language=en 
6. “Medien ‘zahlen’ dem Journalismus einen ‘Preis’ für die Lieferung informativer, aktueller Inhalte” 
(Altmeppen 2011, 258). 
7. Translation: Marxists.org: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1849/02/07.htm 
accessed on March 5, 2011.
8. Translation: Marxists.org: http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me01/me01_066.htm accessed on March 
5, 2011.
9. NetMarketshare. 2011. Top Operating System Share Trend. Retrieved from http://www.
netmarketshare.com/os-market-share.aspx?qprid=9 on October 14, 2011.
10. Forbes Magazine. 2012. The World’s Biggest Public Companies. Retrieved from http://www.
forbes.com/global2000/list/#p_1_s_a0_Software%20&%20Programming_All%20countries_
All%20states_ on February 15, 2013.
11. The Guardian. 2006. EU Hits Microsoft 280.5m Antitrust Fine. By Mark Tran on July 12, 2006. 
Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/jul/12/europeanunion.digitalmedia on 
October 3, 2011.
12. United States of America vs. Microsoft Corporation. 2000. Conclusions of Law. Retrieved from 
http://news.cnet.com/html/ne/Special/Microsoft/conclusions_of_law_and_order.html on October 
3, 2011




on September 28, 2011.
14. End Software Patents. Why Abolish Software Patents. Retrieved from http://en.swpat.org/
wiki/Software_patents_wiki:_home_page on October 6, 2011. No Software Patents. The Dangers. 
Retrieved from http://www.nosoftwarepatents.com/en/m/dangers/index.html on October 6, 
2011.
15. NetMarketshare. 2012. Search Engine Market Share. Retrieved from http://netmarketshare.
com/report.aspx?qprid=4&qptimeframe=M&qpsp=145 on January 19, 2012.
16. Alexa.com Top Sites. Retrieved  from http://www.alexa.com/topsites on November 17, 2011.
17. Google. Philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.google.cn/intl/en/about/company/
philosophy/ on February 15, 2013.
18. Google. Competition. About Ads. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/competition/
howgoogleadswork.html on November 18, 2011.
19. GoogleWatch. Retrieved from http://www.google- watch.org/bigbro.html on January 21, 2012.
20. The Guardian. 2013. NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others. By 
Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill on June 7, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data on July 19, 2013.
21. The Guardian. 2013. NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others. By 
Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill on June 7, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data on July 19, 2013.
22.  Larry Page. 2013. What The…? Google Offi  cial Blog on June 7, 2013. Retrieved from http://
googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/what.html on July 19, 2013.
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23. The Guardian. 2013. Facebook and Google Insist They Did Not Know of Prism Surveillance 
Program. By Dominic Rushe on June 8, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2013/jun/07/google-facebook-prism-surveillance-program on July 19, 2013.
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